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Abstract
In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European
competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. Drawing upon recently devel-
oped economic theories of regulatory competition, our model foresees a number
of qualitative adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct
applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of
exemptions. On the other hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants’
forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition au-
thorities will drive up the number of infringement findings. Although the precise
direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher
levels of regulatory activity. This entails not only greater administrative costs but
also suggests increased transaction costs for doing business in the post-Regulation
1/2003 European Union.
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INTRODUCTION 
 In today’s economy businesses are increasingly subject to the scrutiny of multiple 
antitrust regulators. This is a logical consequence of a global economy where business 
decisions impact several jurisdictions, but it is also a result of the deliberate assignment 
of regulatory duties within and between antitrust systems.1 Regulation 1/2003 of the 
European Commission (“EC” or “Commission”) presents a landmark development in the 
decentralization of global antitrust enforcement.2 By increasing the involvement of 
                                                 
* Visiting Professor, George Mason University School of Law and Professor of Law, Ghent, University. 
Ph.d., Ghent University (2003); J.D. (1999), M.A. (2000), Hamburg University, LLM. (2003), J.S.D. 
(2005) Yale Law School. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Antitrust Symposium held by 
George Mason University Law Review and Howrey & Simon. Participants of the symposium are gratefully 
acknowledged for their suggestions and comments. E-mail: ben.depoorter@yale.edu. 
** Professor of Law and Director, Program of Law and Economics, George Mason University, School of 
Law, and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Milan, School of Law. E-mail: parisi@gmu.edu. 
1 See, generally, MAHER. M. DABBAH, THE INTERNALIZATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY (2003). 
2 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) NO 1/2003 OF 16 DECEMBER 2002 ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES 
ON COMPETITION LAID DOWN IN ARTICLES 81 AND 82 OF THE TREATY, OJ L1/1, 4.1.2003 [hereinafter Reg. 
1/2003]. For an overview of Regulation 1/2003, see, generally, MODERNIZATION OF EUROPEAN 
COMPETITION LAW: THE COMMISSION’S PROPOSAL FOR A NEW REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 81 
AND 82 EC (Jules Stuyck and Hans Gilliams, eds. 2002). 
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national courts and national competition authorities,3 Regulation 1/2003 spreads antitrust 
powers in Europe throughout the Commission and 24 Member States.  
 Despite the obvious motive of decreasing its workload,4 the European 
Commission’s move toward decentralization is puzzling. The reform comes at a time 
when the global consensus on law enforcement is shifting towards centralization.5 For 
instance, recent law enforcement disasters such as the September 11th attack, in which 
enforcement agencies failed to share crucial information that could have prevented this 
tragedy, amply demonstrate how supposed cooperation between administrative bodies 
often turns into competition among these agencies.6 The lack of communication between 
enforcement agencies, particularly their failure to exchange vital information, has fueled 
a widespread belief that competition is not always optimal when it involves 
complementary units of information.7 
                                                 
3  Reg. 1/2003, para’s 6 and 7. 
4 On the Commission’s selective enforcement in light of the imperative to lessen the workload, see, e.g., Jo 
Shaw, Decentralization and Law Enforcement in EC Competition Law, 15 LEGAL STUD. 128 (1995). 
5 Infra, footnote 6. 
6 In its unanimous final report the bipartisan 9/11 Commission recommends a historic restructuring of 
nation's intelligence agencies.  Specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Defense Department, and National Security Council are criticized for their failures in 
gathering and sharing intelligence. See Philip Shenon, Threats And Responses: The Overview; 9/11 Report 
Calls for a Sweeping Overhaul of Intelligence, July 23, 2004, N.Y. TIMES. In the final report the 9/11 
Commission recommends unifying law enforcement by centralization of strategic intelligence and 
operational planning, and aligning intelligence community hierarchy with a new national intelligence 
director and a National Counterterrorism Center. See Final Report, National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States, at http://www.nytimes.com/washington. Similarly, the Belgian 
Government created a unified Federal police force after the country was shocked to find that police and 
justice continually refused to share information that could have resolved and saved lives in a large 
pedophilia murder case. World News Briefs, Belgian Parties Agree To Revise Justice System, May 25, 
1998, N.Y. TIMES. On the Dutroux scandal, see, e.g., Timothy W. Ryback, Four Girls Abducted, Raped, 
Murdered. A Country on Trial, February 23, 1997, N.Y. TIMES. 
7 The analogy between these law enforcement disasters is enforced by the fact that European Antitrust 
regulation is shifting further towards the criminalization of antitrust enforcement. On this trend, in the 
context of business cartels, see CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN 
EUROPE: A STUDY OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE (2003). 
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 Historically, antitrust enforcement in the European Union has been less 
centralized8 than in the United States, where multiple administrative and judicial bodies 
operate on the same level. Regulation 1/2003 further decentralizes antitrust enforcement 
by eliminating notice requirements and investing concurrent responsibilities for the 
application of Article 81(3) in national courts and national competition authorities. The 
modernization of European antitrust law thus adds a new layer of overlapping intra-
jurisdictional competence to the existing multilayer inter-jurisdictional setting 
confronting multinationals.9 In this article we analyze the expected effects of regulatory 
overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation 1/2003. We draw upon 
recently developed economic theories of regulatory competition to analyze the effects of 
delegation of competence in the field of antitrust enforcement. 
 In Section I we summarize some of the main aspects of Regulation 1/2003’s 
regulatory overhaul. Section II employs economic theory to provide a new taxonomy of 
regulatory competition. Section III applies the economic analysis of regulatory 
competition to Regulation 1/2003. Section IV concludes with some broader reflections. 
                                                 
8 See PAUL B. STEPHAN, FRANCESCO PARISI AND BEN DEPOORTER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 840-48 (2003). 
9 The ongoing development and employment of leniency programs on the national and the European federal 
level further contributes to an increasingly fragmented cartel policy that encompasses several overlapping 
jurisdictions. See CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY 
OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY 209-228 (2003). 
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I. THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION OF REGULATION 1/2003 
 On May 1, 2004, a major reform of EC competition enforcement entered into 
force.10 Regulation 1/2003 established a new order for the enforcement of European 
Competition rules.11 The crux of this modernization authorizes joint enforcement of 
competition rules by the Commission’s Directorate-General of Competition, national 
courts, and national antitrust authorities. The rule also abolished the notification system 
and provided for the direct applicability of Article 81(3) in an attempt to ensure the 
“continued effective application”12 of competition rules in an enlarged European Union. 
The main effect of this reform was the broader application of EC competition rules by 
Member State courts and competition authorities.  
 
A. Removal of Notification  
 Prior to Regulation 1/2003, businesses were required, under certain 
circumstances, to notify the Commission of cartel agreements and practices.13 The 
volume of notifications received soon exceeded the Commission’s time and resources. 
This allegedly diverted the Commission’s resources away from the most serious antitrust 
infringements.14 With Regulation 1/2003 the Commission finally made good on its 
                                                 
10 On the same day, the European Merger control system was also revamped. See Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, OFFICIAL JOURNAL L 133, 30.04.2004, pages 1-39. 
11 Council Regulation (EC) n°1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1. 2003, p. 1-25. 
12 Philip Lowe, Current Issues of EU Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement Regime, 24 
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 568 (2004). 
13 For instance, Art. 4 Reg. 17/62 requires that undertakings notify to the Commission of restrictive 
practices that fall under Art. 81(1) EC but for which the undertakings seek an exemption from the 
Commission. See, generally, PAUL B. STEPHAN, FRANCESCO PARISI AND BEN DEPOORTER, THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 816-825 (2003). 
14  1/2003, para. 3. Under EU competition law, the Commission was obliged to act upon all notifications 
within a reasonable period. See Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 22 October 1997 in Joined Cases 
T-213/95 and T-18/96 SCK and FNK v Commission [1997] ECR II-1764 para 55. To appreciate the 
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intention to eliminate the notice requirement.15 In doing so, European competition law 
moved from a standard presumption of illegality to a default assumption of legality, 
where the burden of proof rests with either the party alleging a violation or government 
antitrust authorities.16 Implicit in this reform is the idea that the meaning and major 
precedents of European competition law have matured.17 The elimination of the notice 
requirement has expanded the role of courts and national competition authorities because, 
traditionally, notifications to the European Commission delayed or postponed 
proceedings by national competition authorities and national courts. 
 
B. Decentralized Application of Article 81(3) 
 Regulation 1/2003 makes Treaty Articles 81 and 82, regulating cartels and 
prohibiting abuse of market dominance respectively, directly applicable in their entirety. 
The European Commission thus relinquished its de facto exclusive jurisdiction over 
Treaty Articles 81 and 82 EC. Significantly, this includes the exemption provision in 
Article 81(3).18 The Commission’s previous exclusive jurisdiction over Article 81(3) 
enabled it to navigate the deep water of economic analysis and to set out major 
                                                                                                                                                 
Commission’s workload, consider that the Commission received 40,000 notifications of agreements in the 
first five years after passing Regulation 17. 
15 On the debate over directly applicable exceptions vs. centralized authorization, see G. Marenco, Does a 
Legal Exception System Require an Amendment of the Treaty?, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION ANNUAL 2000: 
THE MODERNIZATION OF EC ANTITRUST POLICY  145-184 (C.D. Ehlerman add I. Atanasiu eds., 2000). See 
also Rain Wesseling, The Commission White Paper on Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust Law: Unspoken 
Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of Alternative Options, 20 (8) E.C.L.R. 420-433 (1999). 
16 Id., para 5 and Art. 2. However, even before Regulation 1/2003, the Commission’s regular use of block 
exemptions created a de facto shift towards a presumption of legality with regard to many types of 
agreements. See, for instance, NOTICE ON EXCLUSIVE DEALING CONTRACTS WITH COMMERCIAL AGENTS, 
O.J. 139, 24.12.1962, p. 2921/62. 
17 See, e.g., the GUIDELINES ON VERTICAL RESTRAINTS [2000] O.J. C291/1 and the GUIDELINES ON THE 
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 81 EC TO HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION AGREEMENTS [2001] OJ C3/2. for a 
historical justification of the centralized notification and authorization system, see WOUTER P.J. WILS, THE 
OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 5, Section 6.2. (2002) (cartel prohibitions were 
revolutionary at the time of adaptation of Treaty Articles 81 and 82).  
18 Id., Art. 3. 
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precedents in such matters as concerted practices,19 the economic defense against 
predatory pricing,20 and other important issues. Although, historically, European 
competition law has struggled to accommodate a rule of reason analysis under Article 
81(1),21 Article 81(3) has traditionally provided a platform to weigh the economic effects 
of cartel agreements. Now, Regulation 1/2003 will induce decentralized application of the 
exemption provision, which goes against the classic argument that national courts lack 
the expertise and resources to evaluate sophisticated economic arguments in antitrust 
matters.22 The Commission appears to believe that most major precedents in Article 81(3) 
jurisprudence have already been announced, such that domestic courts will no longer be 
hindered by the complexity of a full-blown examination of economic issues in 
competition cases. Furthermore, the revitalization of the national competition 
authorities23 - active in some Member States while dormant in others - should provide 
assistance to competition law enforcement at the Member State level.  
 
C. Antitrust Cooperation  
 Anticipating the dangers of fragmented application of competition rules, the EC 
released a Modernization Package,24 which provides a number of coordination and 
                                                 
19 Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission (Re Woodpulp) (Cases 89, 104, 116-117, 125-129/85), [1998] 
E.C.R. 5193. 
20 United Brands v. Commission (case 27/76), [1978] E.C.R. 207. 
21 See e.g., V. Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity – The Need for a Rule of Reason in EEC 
Antitrust, 3 NW J. INT. L. AND BUS. 320 (1981) 
22 On this issue, see Wouter P.J. Wils, The Reform of Competition law Enforcement – Will it Work? 
Community Report, FIDE DUBLIN 33-36 (2004). 
23 Id. Art. 5 and, generally, COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 101, 27.04.2004. 
24 The modernization of competition enforcement consists of a total of six accompanying notices and an 
implementing Commission regulation. See, the Modernization Package [EC Competition Rules Series], 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the 
Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, Official Journal L 123, 27.04.2004, pages 18-
24; Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, OFFICIAL JOURNAL 
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cooperation mechanisms for national courts, national competition authorities and the 
Commission.25 To ensure coherent application of competition rules, the Commission will 
lead enforcement efforts by concentrating on severe infringements, landmark cases,26 and 
infringements that affect more than three member states.27 The supervisory role of the 
Commission is expressed by the provision directing national competition authorities to 
inform the Commission prior to or immediately following the first formal act of 
investigation.28 To facilitate cooperation, the Modernization Package creates information 
exchanges among national competition authorities29 and institutes a competition network 
that meets at regular intervals to discuss competition enforcement strategy.30 At all times, 
the Commission retains the right to intervene,31 and national competition authorities are 
                                                                                                                                                 
C 101, 27.04.2004, pages 43-53; Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the 
courts of the EU Member States in the application of Articles 81 and 82  EC, OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 101, 
27.04.2004, pages 54-64; Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under 
Articles 81 and 82 of  the EC Treaty; OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 101, 27.04.2004, pages 65-77; COMMISSION 
NOTICE ON INFORMAL GUIDANCE RELATING TO NOVEL QUESTIONS  CONCERNING ARTICLES 81 AND 82 OF 
THE EC TREATY THAT ARISE IN INDIVIDUAL CASES (GUIDANCE LETTERS), OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 101, 
27.04.2004, pages 78-80; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 101, 27.04.2004, pages 81-96; Communication from 
the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OFFICIAL JOURNAL 
C 101, 27.04.2004, pages 97-118. 
25 Id. 
26 COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 
101, 27.04.2004, para 15. 
27 Id., para 14. 
28 Art. 11 (3) and (4) Regl. 1/2003 and COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 101, 27.04.2004, para 44. The interaction is two-way. Likewise, the 
Commission informs the national competition authorities of the documents it has collected in its investigate 
process. See, e.g., Art. 11(2). 
29 Reg. 1/2003, para 15. The particulars are contained in the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the 
Network of Competition Authorities, OJ 2004/C 101/3. 
30 See Reg. 1/2003, para 15. The declaration of intention reads as follows: “The Commission and the 
competition authorities of the Member States should from together a network of public authorities applying 
the community competition rules in close cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary to set up 
arrangements for information and consultation. Further modalities for the cooperation within the network 
will be laid down and revise by the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States.” Id. 
31 COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 
101, 27.04.2004, paras 50-57. 
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automatically relieved of their jurisdiction whenever the Commission initiates its own 
proceedings.32 
 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: A NEW TAXONOMY  
 In this Section we draw upon economic theory to provide an integrated model of 
regulatory competition that can be applied to antitrust rules.33 The taxonomy of the 
various modalities of regulation provides a useful framework for analyzing the reform of 
competition enforcement in Europe. We shall apply this taxonomy to the discussion of 
antitrust reform in Section III. 
 
A. Positive Versus Negative Regulation 
 Regulatory activity usually occurs in two forms. Regulation is positive when a 
regulator can act to permit a certain activity that is otherwise not allowed. When a firm 
wishes to partake in a certain activity, it must obtain permission from the regulator. This 
includes, for instance, the issuance of permits or licenses by a regulator. In these cases, 
there is a presumptive general prohibition against an activity that can be overcome 
through the regulator’s positive action.  
 In contrast, regulation is negative when a regulator can act to prohibit an 
otherwise permissible activity. Examples include issuing prohibitory rules or inserting a 
“black list” in regulatory guidelines. 
                                                 
32 Reg 1/2003, para 17. 
33 Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz & Jonathan Klick, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 
GEORGE MASON L. & ECON. WP SERIES, 03-01 (2004).  
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 Under normal circumstances, the absence of restriction equals permission, while 
the absence of permission equals prohibition. Thus, for example, failing to permit an 
activity is equivalent to prohibiting it. Recent models in economic theory demonstrate, 
however, that when we account for the existence of multiple regulatory bodies, positive 
versus negative actions lead to different overall outcomes.34 As we will see in Section III, 
Regulation 1/2003’s abandonment of notice requirements and decentralization of 
exemption jurisdiction are not neutral procedural moves. Such institutional changes are 
likely to affect the direction of substantive competition law. 
 
B. Concurrent Versus Alternative Competence in Antitrust 
 Within a single antitrust agency, a firm simply acquires regulatory input (positive 
or negative) from the designated agency. But when multiple antitrust agencies are 
involved, an individual might be required to secure multiple regulatory inputs or might be 
able to choose among alternative regulatory inputs. In multi-agency settings we can 
further distinguish between concurrent and alternative antitrust competences. With 
concurrent competences the action of all competent antitrust agencies is necessary to 
bring about their collective action. In contrast, with alternative competences the action of 
just one antitrust agency is sufficient to give effect to its activity. 
                                                 
34 Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz & Jonathan Klick, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 
GEORGE MASON L. & ECON. WP SERIES, 03-01 (2004). See also Norbert Schulz, Francesco Parisi and Ben 
Depoorter, Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model, 159 J. OF INST. & TH. ECON. 594-613 
(2002). 
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 Now we can map both dimensions together.  In Figure 1, the italic font indicates 
the allocation of regulatory competence: alternative versus concurrent. The bold font 
indicates the content of the action: positive versus negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Four Dimensions of Regulation 
 
C. Allocation of Antitrust Competence and Regulatory Externalities 
 The relevance of this taxonomy becomes clear when we consider the interaction 
between both dimensions, taking into account externalities in the antitrust regulatory 
process. Differing allocations of antitrust competence are important due to the existence 
of positive and negative regulatory externalities.35  
 
1. Positive Externalities in Antitrust Regulation and Enforcement 
 Positive externalities in antitrust regulation and enforcement occur in (a) 
concurrent and positive regulatory action; and (b) concurrent and negative regulatory 
action.  With concurrent and positive action, the activity of one antitrust regulator 
increases the value and the exploitable rent of the other. For instance, a merger with 
                                                 
35 Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz and Jonathan Klick, Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition, 
GEORGE MASON L. & ECON. WP SERIES, 03-01 (2004). 
 
 
Alternative 
(Substitutes) 
Concurrent 
(Complements) 
Positive Any regulator can permit 
Every regulator 
should permit 
Negative Any regulator can prohibit 
Every regulator 
should prohibit 
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global impact requires the approval of antitrust authorities in the United States and the 
European Union.36 The clearance of the merger by the U.S. Department of Justice creates 
a positive externality by increasing the value of the second approval of the European 
Commission.  
 A positive externality also occurs when the antitrust regulatory activity is 
concurrent and negative. For example, suppose the national competition authorities of 
France and Germany are pursuing a restrictive practice in their territories and the action 
of one is not sufficient to bring the entire infringement to an end or to sanction it 
adequately. In these circumstances, the completion of tasks by the French agency will 
effect a positive externality by increasing the exploitable rents to the German agency 
 The important point to note is that where externalities arise, an individual antitrust 
agency does not take into account the effect of its conduct on other regulatory bodies. 
Thus, positive externalities will be underprovided because the party that produces the 
externality only accounts for the effect of its action on itself.37  
 
2. Negative Externalities in Antitrust Regulation and Enforcement 
 Negative externalities in antitrust regulation and enforcement occur in an 
institutional setting where competences are (a) alternative and positive, and (b) 
alternative and negative. With alternative positive regulatory action, the action of one 
antitrust agency reduces the value and exploitable rent of another agency. This occurs 
when two antitrust agencies have the power to grant licenses to operate a business and 
                                                 
36 Insert reference to Merger law. 
37 Ronald Coase, The Problem Of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON.144 (1960). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
DEPOORTER AND PARISI 
 12
firms need permission from only one of the antitrust authorities. For example, if a firm 
receives a fine reduction from the French national competition authority, this dissipates 
the value of a subsequent leniency fine reduction by the Belgian national competition 
authority.38  
 When regulatory activity is alternative and negative, a first regulatory restriction 
creates a negative externality by making a second restriction irrelevant, since a second 
prohibition can add no further loss. For instance, when several competition authorities are 
investigating the same agreement or practice, a conviction by one national competition 
authority will lead the national competition authorities in other Member States to 
discontinue their proceedings because a second prohibition cannot add any further loss.  
 When negative externalities are involved, activities tend to be overprovided 
because the party that exerts the externality does not account for the negative effect of his 
behavior on others. 
 
3. Competition in Antitrust Regulation and Enforcement  
 Contrasting the four different scenarios we obtain the following effects: 
                                                 
38 COMMISSION NOTICE ON IMMUNITY FROM FINES AND REDUCTION OF FINES IN CARTEL CASES, O.J. C 45, 
19.02.2002. See also COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF COMPETITION 
AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 101, 27.04.2004, para. 37-42. 
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Alternative 
Competence 
(Substitutes) 
Unified 
Competence 
Concurrent 
Competence 
(Complements) 
Positive 
Competence 
Over-Permitted maximizing level X* Under-Permitted 
Negative 
Competence 
Over-Restricted maximizing level X* Under-Restricted 
Figure 2. Allocation of Antitrust Regulatory Power 
 
 Applied to the antitrust setting, our model suggests that the choice of positive 
versus negative regulatory instruments implies different outcomes for antitrust law. 
Because of regulatory externalities, splitting competences leads to inefficiency compared 
to action by a single agency.39 If single-body decision-making is not feasible – an 
assumption driving Regulation 1/2003 – the positive power of a court (to grant an 
exemption) is not the flip side of its negative power (finding of infringement).40 Negative 
externalities involving exemptions lead to a greater number of exemptions, and thus a 
more lenient and permissive antitrust regime. Negative externalities involving findings of 
infringement lead to a higher degree of convictions, creating a more stringent antitrust 
enforcement system.  
                                                 
39 For a formal exposition of this effect, see Jonathan Klick and Francesco Parisi, Intra-Jurisdictional Tax 
Competition, GEORGE MASON LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPER No. 03-16 (2004). On the other hand, 
regulatory competition may carry monitoring benefits in the fact that different agencies’ performances 
provide information to the legislator. See Yoshiro Miwa and Mark J. Ramseyer, Toward a Theory of 
Jurisdictional Competition: The Case of the Japanese FTC, HARVARD LAW AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION 
PAPER No. 482 (2004). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=615565. Similarly, the competition between 
national antitrust authorities might keep the European Commission vigilant. 
40  Id. 
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 The study of the equilibrium level of antitrust regulation and enforcement should 
be further carried out in light of the potential for mutual scrutiny and checks-and-balances 
induced by the alternative regimes. The allocation of antitrust authority and the choice of 
instrument, in fact, also lead to different results with respect to possible regulatory or 
enforcement errors. When allocating negative (alternative) regulatory competences, 
antitrust regulation is more likely to condemn business practices that are efficient and 
beneficial to consumers (type I errors or false positives). When allocating positive 
(alternative) competences, more regulators are more likely to wrongly excuse anti-
competitive conduct (type II errors or false negatives). 
 With this understanding in place, we are ready to analyze the probable effects of 
Regulation 1/2003. 
 
III.  RETHINKING REGULATORY COMPETITION IN EUROPE 
A. Externalities in a Decentralized Exemptions Policy 
 Regulation 1/2003 moves the Article 81(3) exemptions process from a system of 
central authorization41 towards a system of multiple positive (alternative) authorities. As 
explained in the preceding section, alternative positive regulatory action creates negative 
externalities. The action of one antitrust enforcer reduces the value and exploitable rent of 
the other agency. In the context of exemptions, an exemption by  one court dissipates the 
value of a second exemption by courts in other Member States. These negative 
externalities will be overprovided because the first court does not account for the effect of 
                                                 
41  See originally, Regulation 17/62. 
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his decision on other courts. Thus, the direct applicability of the exemption provision of 
Regulation 1/2003 is likely to increase the overall amount of exemptions.  
 
B. Selective Litigation and Forum Shopping 
 Although the European Commission retains some residual authority to correct 
major discrepancies,42 the parallel execution of competition law43 will most likely 
produce greater non-uniformity in the enforcement of European competition law. 
Compounding this problem, the reform removes the notice requirement; thus, plaintiffs 
are left with the exclusive decision to file and select the forum. Plaintiffs will most likely 
file infringement claims in jurisdictions that have a reputation as strict enforcers.44 Such 
forum-shopping is asymmetric because defendants have no comparable ability to 
influence the choice of jurisdiction.45 This will bring more cases into more exacting 
jurisdictions.46 Thus, to the extent that there is a non-uniform application of Article 81 
                                                 
42 See, COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. 
J. C 101, 27.04.2004, para 43 (national competition authorities must respect decisions which are already the 
subject of a Commission decision). Generally, see COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) n°1/2003 of 16 December 
2002 On The Implementation Of The Rules On Competition Laid Down In Articles 81 And 82 Of The 
Treaty, O.J. L 1, 4.1. 2003, p. 1-25.   
43 The Commission Notice On Cooperation Within The Network Of Competition Authorities expressly 
provides for parallel action by two or three national competition authorities when an agreement or practice 
has substantial effects on competition mainly in their domestic markets and the action of only one national 
competition authority would not be sufficient to terminate and sanction the infringement adequately. 
COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 
101, 27.04.2004, para. 12. 
44 See Francesco Parisi and Kimberly Moore, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace, CHIC.-KENT L. 
REV. (2002) (modeling the strategic interaction between plaintiffs and defendants in the context of 
cyberspace). 
45 The problem is exacerbated because, in the case of transnational infringements, national biases by 
national competition authorities also work uni-directionally towards stricter enforcements. That is, under 
the current rules national competition authorities could be excessively aggressive towards foreign 
undertakings but not laxer towards domestic undertakings, because, in the case of refusals to prosecute 
domestic undertakings, complainants still have the option to bring their complaint before the Commission, 
national courts or national competition authorities of another Member State. 
46 Similarly, where judges have varying ideologies case selection might provide a possible explanation for 
the expansion of the domain of legal remedies and causes of action in torts over time. See Vincy Fon, 
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across national competition authorities and national courts,47 this creates incentives for 
selective litigation of antitrust cases, leading to overall stricter levels of competition 
enforcement.48  
 
C. Enforcement by Multiple National Competition Authorities  
 When regulatory activity is alternative and negative, such as when Member 
States’ courts make findings of infringements, a first regulatory restriction makes the 
second restriction irrelevant, since a second prohibition can add no further loss.  
Regulation 1/2003 induces this type of negative regulatory externality because revitalized 
national competition authorities will add a parallel competition enforcement layer. 
Because infringement findings increase with the number of involved parties, Regulation 
1/2003 can be expected to increase total negative externalities. 
 
D. Institutional Design: Correcting Regulators’ Incentives 
 The nature of the regulatory body determines what type of allocation will result in 
over- and under-enforcement of antitrust laws. If regulators are primarily rent-seeking, 
the model provides insight into what structure will temper the (ab)use of their power: 
positive regulatory action should be assigned with alternative regulatory competence, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Francesco Parisi, Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, PUBLIC CHOICE 
(2003); Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi and Ben Depoorter, Litigation, Judicial Path-Dependence, and Legal 
Change, EUROP. J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming). 
47 On the unpredictability and imperfections of antitrust decision-making by courts, see Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO, L. J. 306 (1987-88). 
48 This effect is amplified by the freedom of Member states to impose stricter national rules of competition 
regulation, including criminal sanctions etc. Council Regulation (EC) n°1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on 
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ L 1, 4.1. 
2003, para 8. 
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negative regulatory action should be assigned with concurrent regulatory competence. 
Both conditions will induce lower levels or regulatory action (taking a single-body 
regulator as the benchmark).  
 In contrast, if we assume that regulators shirk their duties and lack the proper 
incentives to engage in effective regulatory action, negative regulatory action should be 
assigned with alternative regulatory competence, and positive regulatory action should be 
assigned with concurrent regulatory competence. These two conditions will encourage 
higher levels of regulatory activity (again taking a single-body regulator as the 
benchmark). 
 
E. Replicating the Flaws of the United States Model 
 Multiplication of veto-powers is a problem for conducting business, especially in 
dynamic industries with high rates of innovation.49 In many respects, Regulation 1/2003’s 
reform of EC competition enforcement recalls federal competition issues in United States 
law.50 The European Union has previously avoided the pitfalls of the U.S. antitrust 
system,51 in which there are “dozens of institutions can say ‘no’ but not one that can say 
                                                 
49 Judge Posner refers to the tendency of antitrust litigation to create multiple lawsuits out of a single 
dispute as a “cluster-bomb effect”. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW , P. 279. The main results, 
according to Posner, are lengthened lawsuits, complicated settlement, magnified uncertainty engendered by 
the litigation, and increased litigation costs. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (Chapter 10, The 
Problem of Enforcement, 279-80 ) (2nd ed, 2001). 
50 See, generally, Richard Posner, Is Federalism Overrated, Keynote Address at American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, Symposium, The New Antitrust Paradox: Policy Proliferation in the 
Global Economy, Washington, D.C., April 21, 2003, at 
http://www.techlawjournal.com/atr/20000914posner.asp. 
51 See, e.g., Thomas, C. Arthur, The Unsatisfactory Application of the Antitrust Statues of the United States 
by the Federal Courts in Stuyck & Gilliams, 61-77. 
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‘yes.’”52 Traditionally, the Commission provided some legal certainty through comfort 
letters and informal decisions upon notification. These decisions are comparable to the 
U.S. Commission of Internal Revenue’s private revenue rulings or to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s “no action” letters.53 Although the European Commission’s 
informal decisions provided somewhat shaky legal protection against domestic action, at 
least they bound the enforcer – unlike the U.S. system.54 In this regard, the elimination of 
the notice requirement creates the risk of increased overall uncertainty.55 
 
F. The Unbearable Lightness of Democracy in Antitrust Enforcement. 
 The analysis set out here is subject to a disclaimer in that the two dimensions of 
regulatory competition collapse into one when the different regulatory bodies act as one. 
To some extent the distortions described above can be minimized through close 
coordination in the European Competition Network.56 A similar opportunity for unified 
action is through the Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant 
Positions, which is composed of representatives of national competition authorities. 
                                                 
52 Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, Future, 61 ANTITRUST L. J. 99, at p. 109 
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Monopolization] 
53 Id. 
54 For a concise description of the U.S. antitrust laws and operating authorities, see Barry A. Pupkin & Ian 
R. McPhie, United States of America, in DEALING WITH DOMINANCE (Nauta Dutilh, ed.), 287-308 (2004). 
55 The Commission hopes to amend this issue through the use of informal guidance letters.  However, save 
for exception circumstances, the Commission does not formally guarantee that such letters will be provided 
upon request. See COMMISSION NOTICE ON INFORMAL GUIDANCE RELATING TO NOVEL QUESTIONS  
CONCERNING ARTICLES 81 AND 82 OF THE EC TREATY THAT ARISE IN INDIVIDUAL CASES (GUIDANCE 
LETTERS), OFFICIAL JOURNAL C 101, 27.04.2004. 
56 COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 
101, 27.04.2004. 
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Regulation 17 installed this body as a forum to discuss cases that are being handled by 
Member States’ national competition authorities.57  
 Nonetheless, these rules and provisions of coordination do not amount to much 
more than mere declarations of intention. Commission commitment decisions do not bind 
national courts and national competition authorities.58 Commission Guidelines are 
likewise not legally binding. While national competition authorities may suspend a 
proceeding when another national competition authority is dealing with a case, they have 
“no obligation to do so.”59 The case allocation provisions are merely indicative criteria,60 
and (as always) Member States remain free to impose stricter competition rules and 
penalties. As such, Regulation 1/2003 and the reform package set no strict binding rules 
that mandate coordination among national competition authorities. Although the 
Commission continues to lead the way,61 one cannot escape the impression that 
Regulation 1/2003 fosters conditions for political democracy to seep into antitrust 
enforcement. National competition authorities are allowed to pursue domestic 
                                                 
57 COUNCIL REGULATION 17. 
58 Reg. 1/2003, para. 22. 
59 Reg. 1/2003, Art. 13(2) and COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE NETWORK OF 
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 101, 27.04.2004, paras 20-22. 
60 Philip Lowe, Current Issues of EU Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement Regime, 24 
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 568 (2004). 
61 In a few instances, the Commission retains exclusive jurisdiction of an infringement claim. Particularly 
when (1) the targeted agreement or practice affects competition in cross-border markets covering more than 
three member states and (2) cases where the Commission is “particularly well placed” to handle a case 
(because of a link with other Community provisions, novel competition issues or developing issues of 
Competition law). See, respectively, paras 14 and 15, COMMISSION NOTICE ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE 
NETWORK OF COMPETITION AUTHORITIES, O. J. C 101, 27.04.2004. These provisions should limit the most 
severe aberrations of a fragmented EU competition law. 
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sensitivities,62 and hierarchical modes of governance are replaced with voluntary 
cooperation and coordination.63 
 The manner in which Regulation 1/2003’s vision of “coordination” plays out in 
practice will determine the extent of the effects described in this Article. One must take 
into consideration the full range of regulatory competition effects when developing an 
informal working order among the multiple European competition regulators. The 
“multiplication of interpreters”64 could significantly increase the risks and costs of 
businesses. Because these heightened costs translate into higher end-prices for 
consumers, careless implementation of Regulation 1/2003 might defeat the very purpose 
of antitrust law. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The European Commission’s Modernization Package has altered EU antitrust 
regulation from a system of unitary positive regulatory action to a system of multiple 
negative regulatory actions. By removing notice requirements and installing a system of 
parallel powers with a directly applicable exemption system, Regulation 1/2003 tips the 
balance of European Union antitrust enforcement towards twenty-four (24) national 
courts and national competition authorities. Our model foresees a number of qualitative 
adjustments resulting from this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the 
exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other 
                                                 
62 But see Wouter P.J. Wils, The Reform of Competition law Enforcement – Will it Work? Community 
Report, FIDE DUBLIN 33, para 22.  (2004) (there is little room for political discretion in the application of 
Competition law). 
63 See, supra, Section I.C. 
64 Easterbrook, Monopolization, at 110. 
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hand, a decentralized system permits private litigants’ forum shopping, and parallel 
enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up the number of 
infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is 
unclear, the overall effect is higher levels of regulatory activity. This entails not only 
greater administrative costs but also suggests increased transaction costs for doing 
business in the post-Regulation 1/2003 European Union. Faced with several parallel 
layers and strategic competitor litigants, businesses are likely to incur higher expenses for 
legal counsel and litigation. 
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